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favour of Britain's departure from the European Union. 7 The project of European integration is thus, for the first time in its history, witnessing a disintegration.
The EU has been thus going through difficult times. The cornerstones of the integration: its fundamental values, the political stability, mutual trust and commitment to the overall process, the economic foundations and last, but certainly not least, security, are undermined and under strain. In these circumstances, the prospects of the European integration come into question. What future is there for the EU and how to bring it about?
In a response to this question, the European Commission has recently published a White paper on the Future of Europe. 8 Therein it has outlined five possible answers. The purpose of this article is to engage critically with the Commission's proposals, evaluate them for their potential capacity for remedying the present crises of the integration, and to the extent this turns out to be insufficient, put forward our own suggestions.
The argument will be developed through five sections. Section two will describe, in some detail, each of the five scenarios the European Commission has put on the table. The next section will subject them to a critical analysis from the perspective of their actual or potential contribution to remedying the existing crisis so to ensure the viability of the integration in the longer run. It will be argued that most of the Commission's scenarios fall short of that goal. To ensure its viability the Union would need to develop into a veritable economic, security, defence, and hence also a political union. If so, the central question then becomes how to reach this goal. How to create a suitable constitutional framework, a workable institutional structure and, in particular, the necessary sociopolitical conditions for a Union that could meaningfully respond to the empirical challenges it has been faced with? Section four will claim that this could be achieved by launching a new constitutional process which would endow the integration with a new constitutional form permeated by the normative spirit of pluralism. Section five will conclude. European Commission, 'White Paper on the Future of Europe', available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/white-paper-future-europe-reflections-and-scenarios-eu27_en
II. Five Scenarios for the Future of the European Union
In March 2017 the European Commission published a White Paper on the Future of Europe. 9 It has sketched five possible scenarios for the development of the Union in the following decade. While all scenarios share a starting point, according to which 27 member states will move forward together, 10 they outline quite different images of the future. The first scenario, tagged 'Carrying on', is essentially about the preservation of the status quo.
As its title suggests, it is not the least but also not the most ambitious scenario for the future of the Union. It stays faithful to the Union's present political incrementalism.
Accordingly, the problems are addressed as they arise and in response to them the legislative and political agenda is set and, not infrequently, also upgraded. 11 Under this scenario, the economic crisis is addressed by strengthening the single market, by investing into infrastructure and by further ring-fencing the euro against external and internal shocks. 12 The humanitarian and the security crises, on the other hand, are to be primarily approached by the member states alone, with little assistance coming from the EU. This scenario, ultimately, depends on the political willingness of each and every member state to push the integration further. This also explains why in this scenario the Commission refrained from mentioning the political crisis and the rule of law and democracy dilemmas. These, apparently, stand in the way of reaching the prerequisite consensus and therefore ought to be better swept under the carpet rather than addressed and potentially resolved.
The second scenario: 'Nothing but the single market' is a step back from the status quo just described. Here the Commission proceeds from the assumption that due to divergences between the member states no consensus will be found to tackle the monetary, fiscal, security and other more encompassing political challenges. 13 The member states shall
thus focus on what they presumably have in common and that is the single market. The EU will launch a policy of deregulation, so that again an increasing number of competences beyond the single market will be exercised by the member states individually or in a more or less co-ordinated cooperation between them. This could potentially, the Commission 9 Idem. 10 Idem at 15. 11 Idem at 16. 12 Idem. 13 Idem at 18.
predicts, create negative consequences for the euro and the area of freedom security and justice whose externalities might, eventually, also work at the detriment of the single market itself. 14 Therefore, while the single market could more easily deepen with regard to non-human factor related economic freedoms, it is not unforeseeable to witness its slowing down with regard to the free movement of workers and services. 15
Scenario number three takes the existing differences between the member states seriously and allows the more ambitious among them to do more as the others stay behind, limiting their participation to the core policy areas shared by all. Pursuant to the Commission, under the scenario 'Those who want more do more' the coalitions of willing could develop in the policy fields beyond the present status quo to respond to the monetary, fiscal, security and defence challenges. 16 These new policy fields would require new legal instruments to be devised and enforced by an upgraded institutional structure of the Union for which a supplementary budgetary scheme would need to be set-up. 17
However, the position of the less ambitious member states would need to remain unaffected by this enhanced co-operation scenario. The non-participating member states could join in the future under the objectively prescribed conditions equally open to all. 18
In the fourth scenario the Commission envisages that the Union would do less, but more efficiently. This scenario too closely tracks the existence of a national consensus and forecasts that due to growing divergences between the member states the EU will gradually limit its focus to the policy fields in which it can achieve the outcomes more efficiently than the member states individually. Accordingly, the EU would enhance its role in the fields of innovation, trade, security, migration, the management of borders and defence, as well as the euro. 19 On the other hand, the EU would do less with regard to the regional development, public health and social policies which do not bear directly on the functioning of the single market. The five scenarios about the future of the European Union can be, depending on their attitude to the EU's present shape and ambitiousness about its future, divided into three groups: the status quo vision, the status quo ante vision and the reformist vision of the Union. The first and the third scenario are part of the status quo vision of the EU.
According to the latter, the EU should, as much as possible, stay as it is. The first scenario obviously belongs here. This is apparent already by its name: 'Carrying on.' However, the third scenario, despite its differently suggesting denomination, is a version of a status quo too. For those member states, which want more integration, can have more integration only as long as this does not affect those member states who are less keen to integrate.
The past and present of differentiated integration in the European Union is a testimony to the fact that a hence envisaged enhanced co-operation does not work. 24 To the extent that it exists, it remains exceptional, instrumental to the status quo maintained by the unwilling member states whose unaffected status is set in the Treaty stone. 25
On the other hand, it is central to the status quo ante vision of the integration that the existing competences of the Union should be repatriated to the member states. 
III. Critical Analysis of the Visions of the Future of the European Union a) The Status Quo Vision
To what an extent can the three visions of the EU's future help resolving the ongoing crises of the integration and contribute to its viability in the longer run? This is a question that each of the three visions will be subject to in this section. Their crisis solving capacity and viability ensuring potential will be analysed along the economic, security and defence as well as the political dimension of the EU functioning. The latter, of course, includes the rule of law and democracy. Beginning with the status quo vision first, it must be observed that the status quo cannot be a solution to any of the crises of the integration. It is their source instead. The main reason for that lies in the half-built constitutional structure of the integration. The latter is caught between the worlds of an international organization and a sui-generis constitutional polity. These has had negative consequences for the integration both in symbolic as well as practical terms.
The European Union acts, for indeed needs to act, as a constitutional polity of sorts, but it continues to (re)present itself to its citizens via member states as an international organization. This false or at least disingenuous self-representation creates an identity crisis on the national and supranational level, which fuels a democratic illusion in the peoples of Europe. Over the last sixty years of integration more and more competences, literally in all the fields of social life, including those that have traditionally been considered as essential and exclusive to the functioning of the state, have been exercised by the supranational institutions. On the other hand, the political life, the democratic selfawareness and the vibrant public sphere have largely remained confined to the national level. While power has thus migrated to the supranational level, its democratic control stays bound to the national level. 28 The popular democratic self-imagination has not caught up with the political power reality. The majority of citizens continue to understand and practice democracy as if the latter was still exercised exclusively in a self-contained nation state. In so doing, they participate in a democratic illusion, in a national democracy whose actual content has been much slimmed down and whose representatives no longer take the decisions for which they are, however, still held responsible in the popular imagination.
This mismatch between the political power and its democratic legitimation affects the Union's actual capacity to act. The symbolical problem causes a practical one. Due to its half-built constitutional structure, the EU is trapped into a paradox of having too many and too few competences at the same time. The history of crises in the last decade or so has revealed that the Union apparently lacks competences to tackle efficiently its economic, security, defence and political challenges. The member states have either been reluctant to transfer the competences necessary for the efficient functioning of the Union or, when these have been transferred, they have blocked their exercise out of a concern for their more particular national interests. At the same time, however, these same member states have proven themselves unable to respond to the crises efficiently because of the competences they have already transferred to the Union. The scope of the competences transferred, in a combination with the external transnational environment, has de facto prevented the member states to act. 29
This development has left the EU in a double handicap. 30 The supranational level is handicapped because it has received too few competences, whereas the national level is handicapped since it has transferred too many of them. As a result, neither side can act when this is really required. The result is a decrease in the output legitimacy.
Furthermore, the insufficient social embeddedness of the supranational democracy hinders a legitimate and efficient exercise of the existing supranational competences and effectively prevents the transfer of new competences to the Union, irrespectively how much they are needed for its successful functioning. Moreover, the described division of competences also often leads to the avoidance of responsibility for the inaction and for blaming each other for the absence of positive outcomes and/or for producing the negative ones. This frustrating finger pointing, mutual accusations and EU bashing typically occurs when it is the least needed and when a joint action would be required most. That is in the time of crisis. It is then when the above described democratic illusion breaks apart. 31 The crisis tends to heighten the popular awareness of how the system really works and this, combined with the inevitable search for a scapegoat, provokes a rebellion against the 'Brussels bureaucracy' which has, allegedly, usurped the powers that ought to belong to the member states and their people. 32
In short, the gap between the supranational power and national democracy obstructs the present functioning of the European Union and blocks its capacity to address the existing and new challenges in the future. One of such challenges is certainly the economy. A halfmade European house has turned out as economically unviable. The single market, as the economic heart of the Union, is not just about free trade in the four economic factors of production, but it is also a source of social, redistributive and political effects, which go way beyond the exclusively economic nature of the single market and call for its democratic underpinnings. These are, however, missing. Furthermore, a truly functioning single market, requires a monetary union, a single currency to avoid the distortion of competition. As it has turned out, in the absence of a fiscal union there can be no meaningful monetary union. But, at the same time, there can be no fiscal union without a prerequisite democratic underpinning typical of a political union. In short, the economic integration goes hand in hand with a political integration -or not. In the absence of one, the other cannot emerge or function either.
A half-made EU house is also incapable of ensuring security, both internally as well as externally. This has been proven by the recent migration crisis, which has basically resulted in the collapse of the Schengen system. The individual member states simply lack the capacity of responding to the current waves of migrations. However, they have simultaneously been unwilling to transfer sufficient competences or to take joint 31 See, eg, J. Habermas, 'Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis' (lecture delivered at KU Leuven, 26 April 2013) accessed 4 July 2017, observing that the output legitimacy, as long as it lasted, was the principal way of democratic legitimation in the EU. 32 For a recent illustration see the speech of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Waszczykowski, arguing that: 'Brussels bureaucracy usurping various privileges and Central European states -our part of Europe, rooted in the respect of our rights.', available at: https://poland.pl/politics/foreignaffairs/minister-waszczykowski-road-healing-eu-runs-through-respect-memb/ decisions on the supranational level, which would enable the latter to develop its own supranational security apparatus, meaningful forces for border control, a coast guard as well as the European army. Instead, walls and barbed-wires were erected on the internal borders of the European Union, splitting the EU from the inside.
Finally, the EU has been unable to stop, let alone to revert, the regression of the rule of law and democracy in several of its eastern member states. 33 Being stuck in the status quo, whose functioning inherently depends on the consensus of all the member states, the EU has been busy harnessing this fragile equilibrium and has, hence, been politically reluctant to approach the constitutional backsliding seriously. 34 Moreover, the way to proceed differently, even if there was political willingness, is to a certain extent closed.
The EU lacks democratic legitimacy to interfere with the internal constitutional functioning of these member states in order to turn them into well-ordered polities, observing the foundational values of the Union. 35 The half-built European constitutional structure, its competence handicap, legitimacy deficit and the democratic illusion in which the citizens of the member states partake apparently allow the latter to get away even with the violations of the most basic values of the Union. As a result, the status quo vision of the EU, following which the latter would stay more or less the same, appears to be unsustainable in practice and hence normatively unattractive.
b) The Status Quo Ante Vision
What about the status quo ante vision? The latter has grown in its prominence with the deepening of the crises in the integration and has established itself as an alternative to the presently unsustainable status quo. Its message is clear and simple. The EU is not the solution, it is part of the problem. 36 The solutions for the loss of national competences, for a democratic deficit, for the malfunctioning economy as well as for the growing security crisis ought to be sought not in pooling more sovereignty, as has traditionally been the case, but in claiming the powers back from the Union. And, so would the attempts at creating a European identity on the top or even in place of the national one. Instead, the latter should be boosted again. What is more, by way of redomestication of a democratic political life, the conditions for ensuring the economic prosperity would be recreated.
With the re-nationalization of politics, the EU political union would be, of course, ruled out.
Without the political union, there can be no fiscal union and in its absence the monetary union, as the crisis has demonstrated, cannot function either. The single currency should thus be abandoned. This would permit the economically weaker member states to regain their competitiveness. It would free them from the economic yoke of the northern member states, in particular from the German hegemon 38 that has been producing undemocratic and above all socially unequitable results. The member states should again focus primarily on creating favourable conditions for the flourishing of their own national economies. A whole range of protectionist measures, if need be, should thus be adopted. In particular, the domestic work force should be protected from the foreign competition, which requires limiting or even halting the free movement of workers and services.
Eventually even the single market should be scaled back, reducing it merely to a free trade area. Last but not least, cutting down on the economic migration would also benefit the security interests. This would go hand in hand with the reinstatement of border controls, which and only which could ensure a proper control of migrations. In so doing, the dysfunctional Schengen regime, which now poses a threat to the national security, would be eventually removed. The states would thus again seize a full control over their own security.
The just presented arguments in favour of a status quo ante, which favour the conditions that existed prior to the establishment of the European Union, are part of a wider anti-EU common whole, resting on the normative foundations of actual practice-driven solidarity. 43 If it was clear to the founding fathers of European integration already in the 1950s that a self-contained nation state is unable to survive let alone prosper, the same conclusion is even more pertinent today. In the globalized world of the 21st century, the states no longer occupy either an exclusive or a central position in ruling the world, but compete with a variety of public, hybrid and private transnational non-statist actors. 44 These, and among them especially the financial markets and transnational corporations, can act almost entirely independently from the states, while simultaneously, indeed decisively, affecting their functioning. 45 As again the financial crisis has demonstrated, not only the member states appeared helpless in the hands of global rating agencies, but even the European Union, the biggest trading block in the world, was for a long time unable to convince the global financial markets that it can economically save its member states and thus ensure its own economic viability. 46 In the absence of the access to funding, which was dependent on the global financial markets willingness to lend, the states could have remained completely sovereign and absolutely democratic, but this kind of sovereignty and democracy -absent of a veritable self-determination in practice -could amount to nothing more and nothing less than a dead letter. 47 As we have known for a long time, the state is sovereign to the extent it can actually exercise its sovereignty in practice, if need be, and usually, in co-operation with other states. 48 The same is true of democracy.
This fact demonstrates that the normative expectations of the supporters of the unravelling of the integration are simply empirically unfounded. The interests of the nation state in the 21st globalized century can be only protected in broader associations of states, where these pool their resources to meet the challenges that exceed their individual capacities of addressing them efficiently. Most of the present crises of the 43 Schuman Declaration, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schumandeclaration_en 'Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. European Union have been caused not because there was too much Europe Union, but since 'there was not enough union in the Union.' 49 To insist that a state can ensure its economic welfare through protectionist policies runs against the decades of research and practical evidence that protectionism can only work in the shorter run, but it is always economically fatal in the middle and certainly in the longer run. 50 Stipulating that the readoption of the national currencies can strengthen the national economies by increasing their competitiveness through currency manipulation can again work only in the shorter run. 51 Competitiveness based on currency manipulation is merely artificial. It is a sign of weakness of a state and is hence unsustainable in a global competitive environment.
Globalization has, similarly, shrunken distances and compressed time. The role of a territory, of physical borders has changed. 52 With an increased mobility of population, facilitated not just by the modern and increasingly affordable technologies, but also caused by huge demographic and wealth disequilibrium in the world, migrations are a fact. They cannot be stopped. They can only be managed and controlled. 53 However, this control can no longer be exercised efficiently by member states individually. They simply lack, as the recent EU migration crisis has demonstrated, technical resources and personnel to address the problem in all of its dimensions.
Moreover, a great majority of EU member states are due to negative demographic trends in need of economic migrations, encompassing skilled and less-skilled workers, to ensure the viability of their economies, and especially the sustainability of their health and social protection systems. 54 The single market and the single currency, based on the sound monetary and therefore also fiscal and political union, that the promoters of the status quo ante vision oppose, turn out to be indispensable for the survival of the nation states in Europe. The same conclusion applies to security. This can be much better (perhaps only) achieved by creating a veritable and operational common European area of freedom, security and justice, by drawing the national and supranational resources to fight the rising terrorist and other security threats together. The retreat behind the national confines with an aim of ensuring security when those posing security threats are in no lack of mobility, undermines security instead of strengthening it.
The proponents of the 'less Europe' are aware of that and have therefore called for a single security and/or defence union. 55 However, in so doing, they are guilty of a huge paradox.
By calling for a European security and defence union they are, in fact, arguing in favour of the most Europe, while being simultaneously against more Europe. They are, apparently, oblivious to the fact that the EU as a security and defence union would require a robust supranational political community in whose democratic decision-making processes the security and defence issues need to be nested. However, the emergence of such a community is something that they bitterly oppose. In so doing, they are, however, practically defying the objective for which they nominally strive.
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be concluded that the promoters of the status quo ante vision, which should result in the (incremental) unmaking of the European Union, are prescribing a remedy that will not only break the EU apart, but it will, in so doing and explicitly contrary to their intentions, ultimately lead to a decline of the European nation states too. If we couch this in the language of proportionality, we can conclude that the promoters of the status quo ante vision have chosen the wrong means for the achievement of their ends, which are, on the presently available empirical premises, anyhow unattainable.
c) The Reformist Vision
If the present status quo in the European Union is unsustainable and if the unmaking of the integration is not just a normatively incoherent project, but one that is practically infeasible at least in the long run, then we are left with the reformist vision. As we have seen, the European Commission has worded its reformist scenario in that the member states should do much more together. It is submitted that the Commission is right. It has pointed its finger in the right direction. However, its proposal lacks ambition, concretization and it fails to centre on the question which is of a real importance. Our critique of the status quo and the status quo ante visions of the future of Europe has already demonstrated that the viability of the integration in the following decades does not call just for a quantitative change, in form of more competences being transferred to the Union. What is required, in fact, is a qualitative leap. The EU should become a fullyfledged economic, security and defence as well as a political union. In this way, it would acquire the overall constitutional, institutional and, perhaps most importantly, sociopolitical means to tackle the existing and impending crises.
As an economic union, 56 the EU would possess not just the monetary but also the necessary fiscal means to provide for a smooth functioning of the completed single market and to compensate for the redistributive externalities that the free movement and the undistorted competition cause. With fiscal competences the EU would be able to raise supranational taxes, which would trickle into a more encompassing supranational budget.
This could be used for financing not just the day to day operation of the institutions, but the supranational structural programs for remedying the national economic imbalances.
As a fiscal union, the EU would, of course, also function as a transfer union, subject to the supranational and national political willingness, so that a genuine European social policy would gradually develop. The completion of the banking union would also lead to a better regulated and hence sounder financial sector in the EU. Having adopted all these economic measures, the EU would be much better constitutionally equipped to respond to the internal and external economic shocks as they arise.
The reformed European Union would also round up its presently scattered security and defence potentials. 57 As a security and defence union the EU would create a supranational police force, a supranational prosecutorial office, a supranational coast guard and a supranational army. All these institutions would be, initially, much less staffed than their national counterparts. Their role would be to complement and not to replace the national security and defence institutions. They would be, in principle, competent to act in the affairs, which affect the interests of the supranational institutions and of the union as a whole. The running and operation of the Schengen regime, in particular the defence of the EU external borders, would make the core competence of the EU security and defence union. This would, necessarily, entail that the conditions for entry into the Union would need to be the same in all member states. As a corollary a genuinely single European asylum, visa and migration policy would need to be established. The supranational security and armed forces could, however, be also deployed in the matters not exclusively of a supranational concern upon the initiative from and subject to the corresponding financial contributions by the interested member states.
However, the economic, security and defence union cannot come into existence without the prerequisite democratic underpinning. They, eventually, require a political union. The political powers, which have travelled and still will travel to the supranational level, have to be accompanied by a simultaneous supranational democratic political awareness and actual practices of supranational democratic legitimation. In particular the resolution of the humanitarian crisis, which entails a fundamental reform of the existing asylum system, requires a high degree of inter-statal solidarity. This cannot be (or ideally should not be) forced on anyone. It must come about through an inclusive democratic political deliberation on the supranational level. Therefore, the EU humanitarian crisis cannot be successfully resolved in the absence of a genuine EU political union. The same conclusion applies to the security crisis. The badly needed EU internal and external security forces, the EU police, the coast-guard and the army, cannot come into being and can even less function without being situated in and constrained by a European, eg supranational, democratic political and legal framework. Finally, the EU cannot meaningfully contribute to the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law in its rogue member states when it is itself suffering from a rule of law and democratic deficit. The EU is in need of a sufficient democratic legitimacy for interfering with the constitutionally back-sliding member states.
The EU as a political union could ensure this basis of democratic legitimation. However, to This is the question that the next section is going to address.
IV. The New Hardware and Software for the European Union
The argument is this. The EU requires a constitutional form, by which it would move beyond its present hybrid, ambiguous sui generis character that has proven unable to attract the peoples' imagination, let alone their political and civic support. The negative sui generis definition of the Union's character, whose essence is that the EU is neither a state nor an international organization, should give way to an affirmative conception. This terms is a constitutional form, an identity conferring structure, a container, in a nutshell:
a new hardware, which could sustain the EU as an economic, security, defence and political union. This hardware, of course, ought to be equipped with software that will make it operational. And, above all, the way of creating this new hardware and software must be identified too.
The three-pronged claim that will be defended in what follows is therefore this. First, the EU should embark on a new constitutional process. Second, this should re-constitute it as a union -a special federal constitutional form. Third, this new constitutional form would function on the basis of the normative prescriptions of pluralism. In other words, the launching of the constitutional process is an act of foundation. The union is a constitutional form, the hardware, resulting out of the newly launched constitutional process. The normative spirit of pluralism is the software which makes the integration's functioning possible and, hopefully, viable too.
To begin with the proposal of launching a new constitutional process for the EU, it needs to be explained why the EU should be again investing into constitutionalism and, above all, what kind of constitutionalism should that be. In my previous work I have, admittedly, been rather sceptical of constitutionalism beyond the state and, especially, of its application in the European Union. The constitutional language has been used in an uncritical, indiscriminative and inflationary manner. 60 This has also been one, perhaps not the most important, reason for the failure of the Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe. 61 Another reason was that the EU launched the process of documentary constitutionalization at an inappropriate time. The enlargement was a success. The Euro was a strong currency. The economic growth was high, in some member states it was skyrocketing. There was optimism everywhere, among individuals and on the stock markets.
In short, these were good times. Good times, however, are no good for constitutionmaking. As we know, modern constitutionalism is about discontinuity. 62 It is about a rupture with the past. As an onwards looking discourse, modern constitutionalism is about bringing progress, about overcoming the inglorious past and present, which are to be replaced by a better order of things -a new polity. 63 There is thus no need to pursue discontinuity with times of prosperity. This was a lesson learned in 2005.
However, today, when the EU is in an existential crisis, we must continue learning from the same lesson. The contemporary EU is in need of a sharp discontinuity with its modus operandi of the last decades. We need a new constitutional process for the European integration to create the necessary discontinuity. A new constitutional form must be introduced and the old should be left behind. Constitutionalism, as its name suggests, is about constituting such new forms through the provision of an imaginary framework in support of which those living under it, its subjects, can be mobilized. Of course, I am drawing here almost on the thinnest conception of constitutionalism, understanding it as a process of a common search for a common good. 64 Constitutionalism is, accordingly, conceived of as mobilization of the constituent power of the European Union consisting of the EU citizens in their dual, national and supranational, capacity; the member states and the supranational institutions. They are to determine, after an inclusive democratic deliberation, how much (more or less) they want to do and achieve together.
This new constitutional process is envisaged as a litmus test to identify the depth and breadth of the commitment to the European common good. As explained above, the overwhelming scope of empirical challenges to the EU calls for a correspondingly deep commitment to the European cause. However, if this is found lacking -and the constitutional process will be there to attest this -it cannot be forced top down on the unwilling member states and their people. The lack of commitment to the common EU good will simply need to be acknowledged and translated into a new, structurally differentiated configuration of the European Union. However, this is a point to which we shall return later.
At this stage, it is important to put forward a constitutional form which could enjoy the support of the greatest number of constitutional actors in the EU and which could, at the constitutional form can be provided by the concept of a union. 65 The union is an example of a federalist constitutional form, which on a federal continuum 66 occupies the middle ground between a confederation, which is an entity under international law, and a federation, which is a state. 67 The union is a three level entity. 68 The national level is made of the member states, which are preserved as sovereign entities, autonomous legal orders and self-standing political communities. The supranational level, the union stricto sensu, is represented and governed by the (mostly) Brussels based supranational institutions. The supranational level is also sovereign, albeit in a functional sense. It exists as an autonomous legal order and a corresponding supranational political community that draws its legitimating force from the EU citizens. The national and the supranational levels ultimately exist side by side to each other, in a non-hierarchical manner as part of the third level of the union: the EU as a common whole. This common whole spans the national and supranational levels without consuming their autonomy. 69 What are the advantages of the union as a constitutional form that could turn the proposed new EU constitutional process into a success rather than into another failure? The union is, foremost, attractive since it provides a framework for optimizing the interests of all the constitutive entities involved. If the member states are insufficient in and of themselves to tackle the contemporary challenges, and if, equally, the supranational EU of Brussels cannot act alone, without the member states, what is obviously needed is a constitutional form, a system of government, a legal and political entity that preserves both. The member states remain sovereign states. The supranational level obtains and secures its autonomous stature, with sufficient competencies; while they both exist inside a common whole that requires preserving the two in the necessary equilibrium. In this way, they can optimize their respective interests. They reinforce each other in pursuing their mutual objectives and, in so doing, contribute to the union's long-term viability. 70 However, the union is attractive also from the citizens' and democratic political perspective. It provides an utile, inclusive imaginary framework. We can finally say what the EU is, rather than sticking to some amorphous sui generis identification. Meanwhile the union also permits its citizens to preserve themselves as the citizens of member states, to cherish their existing national identity, while complementing it with a supranational, pan-European identity. By avoiding the traditional zero-sum approach, according to which a supranational identity is parasitic on the national identity (and vice versa), the union provides a conceptual framework for making the two not just compatible, but actually mutually reinforcing. In so doing, the union could facilitate the development of a genuine EU political community, which would not come at the expense of the national communities. The idea is to preserve the civic identity that individuals as citizens of the member states presently have and to simultaneously upgrade it and complement it with an additional supranational layer, which is required for supranational legitimating purposes. In so doing, socio-political grounds would be laid for the emergence of transnational solidarity that is required for the establishing and functioning of the fullyfledged economic, security, defence and the political union. The normative spirit of pluralism, as the union's software, is about the recognition of plurality, of the fact that the member states and the supranational level are autonomous legal orders and distinct political communities. It is essential to pluralism that this distinctiveness is not just preserved, but nourished and encouraged. 75 The distinctiveness is namely an expression of autonomy, both individual and collective, which stems from the recognition of equal human dignity as a license for diversity. 76 By way of an equal disagree in a productive manner. In the specific context of launching the new constitutional process for European integration this means that the latter should not strive for the consensus by all means and neither should it result in the merciless imposition of the will of the qualified majority on the minority. Normative spirit of pluralism encourages creative constitutional solutions for deeply diverging interests of the different actors involved in the constitution-making process.
One of such constitutional means is the idea of a differentiated integration. The European Union has been no stranger to it, but at the same time the different faces of differentiated integration in the EU have always been considered rather exceptional, 80 as a departure from the overall uniformity principle. Perhaps the time has come to recognize that certain differences among the member states of the EU are so deep and so persistent that they are in fact structural in nature. 81 If so, they would need to be acknowledged as something normal and should be built into the constitutional structure of the integration. European integration, which should establish, provided that there is a popular and institutional support for such a scenario, the EU as a union embedded in the normative spirit of pluralism. The article has presented the arguments in favour of such a scenario and it has provided reasons for which the many constitutional actors in the EU, as well as the latter as a whole, could benefit from it. The article has been driven by a normative ambition of equipping the EU with adequate constitutional, institutional and socio-political means for coping with its many crises. However, how likely is it that the proposed constitutional relaunching of the integration actually takes place in practice? As Niels Bohr reportedly said: 'It is hard to make predictions, especially about the future.' We should therefore shy from this temptation and limit ourselves just to the evaluation of the present. By so doing, the following can be observed.
The EU is in an existential crisis. There is thus a strong pressure to act. Something needs to be done. What will be actually done, admittedly, in many respects depends on the political will in the biggest EU member states. The election results in the Netherlands and, in particular, in France, where Macron openly campaigned on the EU reformist agenda, suggest that after the German elections there might be a rare, indeed historical window of opportunity for a qualitative reformist leap in the process of European integration. The civil society, which has made its transnational pro-European voice heard more than ever before; 82 the academics 83 as well as a growing number of the national and EU political class have apparently realized that while the way back to the idealized times of the nation state is essentially empirically closed off, the existing status quo is also plainly unsustainable. The present article has drawn a map of just how this impasse in the process of the integration might be overcome.
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See, for example, The Ljubljana Initiative http://chr.si/; http://www.marchforeurope2017.eu/academic-community-launches-appeal-in-support-to-the-marchfor-europe/; The Rome Manifesto https://www.united-europe.eu/uncategorized/the-rome-manifestoproposals-by-the-next-generation/ etc. 83 See, the draft Constitution for the European Union, authored by Peter Jambrek, http://www.predsednik.si/uprs/uprs.nsf/cc1b0c2e0c8f0e70c1257aef00442bbd/6e9c355dcac33036c1258 0a0004d8dc2/$FILE/Predlog%20nove%20evropske%20ustave%20The%20new%20draft%20treaty%20for% 20the%20constitution%20of%20the%20European%20Union.pdf.
